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Abstract 
 
Using survey data on 157 large private Hungarian and Polish companies this paper 
investigates links between ownership structures and CEOs’ expectations with regard to sources of 
finance for investment. The Bayesian estimation is used to deal with the small sample restrictions, 
while classical methods provide robustness checks. We found a hump-shaped relationship between 
ownership concentration and expectations to rely on public equity. The latter is most likely for firms 
where the largest investor owns between 25%-49% of shares, just below the legal control threshold. 
Profitable firms rely on retained earnings, consistent with the ‘pecking order’ theory. Firms controlled 
by domestic institutional investor are more likely to borrow from domestic banks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 After the removal of state subsidies and imposition of “hard” budget constraints on 
reforming enterprises in Central European countries (Kornai, 2001), it was expected that 
when making investment decisions, managers of restructuring enterprises would rely either on 
internally generated finance or external private sources that provide finance on competitive, 
market terms. However, the financial system that had replaced the state support remained 
underdeveloped, and even at the time of writing is lagging behind comparator economies 
(EBRD 2006). It is critical to understand factors influencing financing decisions of firms in 
such an environment for informing policies and incentive schemes supporting the market-
oriented reform (Gros and Suhrcke, 2000; Berglof and Bolton 2002; Gros and Steinherr 2004; 
Mickiewicz 2005; Köke and Schröder 2006). Given the circumstances, companies acquire 
finance for investment using alternative strategies, which are related both to the identity of the 
owners and to the concentration of shares. Companies with foreign owners have advantage in 
their access to finance that is coming from abroad. Domestically owned firms substitute for 
underdeveloped external financial market by forming industrial (-financial) groups. In 
general, firms in transition economies may use a variety of financing sources. Given the 
complexity of the financing decision, it is important to model simultaneously the impact of 
factors influencing the financing choice on the all available financing options.  
 Economics and finance literatures indicate that the firm’s selection of financing 
options may be contingent on its governance characteristics such as ownership concentration 
and the identity of owners (La Porta et al., 1999; Macey and Miller, 1997 and others). Large-
scale privatizations in transition economies created a wide spectrum of corporate governance 
models ranging from widely dispersed individual ownership to predominance of foreign 
investors (Filatotchev et al., 2003; Andreff, 2006). Therefore, it is important to verify links 
between managerial financing decisions and corporate governance characteristics of the 
companies. 
 
Considering the determinants of investment financing strategies for the firm in the 
economic transition, previous research suggests a number of theoretical frameworks that build 
on agency perspective and resource-based view of the firm. First, in the environment of not 
fully developed capital markets, with thin trading and low protection of minority 
shareholders, the degree of ownership concentration may affect the capital structure choices. 
In particular, equity investors are confronted with a trade-off between gains of better 
monitoring provided by concentrated ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and negative 
effects of entrenchment of the controlling shareholder who may try to extract “private benefits 
of control” at the expense of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). Anticipating that, 
the dominant shareholder may be aware of the cost-of-finance implications, when making the 
financing decision. In particular, a strong demand for new equity issues may be relatively 
high when a strategic owner is present (so the agency problem is alleviated), but does not 
have full control. The latter may put the minority shareholders’ interests in danger by 
removing constraints on the dominant owner’s decisions and by increasing risk of (implicit) 
expropriation. 
In addition, availability of private benefits of control implies that the dominant 
shareholder may take into account the implications of equity finance for the ownership 
composition, especially in the region of the ownership concentration being close to the legal 
control threshold of 50%. As a result, there may be a non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and reliance on new equity finance. 
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Research also suggests that the identity of a dominant owner may have an impact on 
financing strategy of the firm. For example, finance from abroad may be an important channel 
to overcome constraints on the domestic financial markets. Presence of foreign owners, 
therefore, may facilitate access to this type of finance (Filatotchev et al., 2003). In addition, 
institutional void theory suggests that links between the firm and domestic institutional 
investors may facilitate access to domestic bank finance and to the state financial support, in 
particular for large business groups (Filatotchev et al., 2005; Filatotchev and Mickiewicz, 
2006; Okhmatovskiy, 2006).  
 
These links between ownership structure and the firm’s financing decisions may be 
moderated by a number of the firm-level characteristics. For example, it may be easier for 
large firms to overcome informational asymmetries, and, therefore, they find the access to 
public equity finance less difficult than smaller companies. In addition, the firm’s reliance on 
the internal source of retained earnings may be positively associated with higher past 
profitability, which is consistent with the ‘pecking order’ theory of financing (Myers 1984; 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999). 
 
In general, actual financial outcomes result from the interplay between preferences of 
managers and characteristics of the sources of finance. In this paper we focus on managerial 
perceptions with regard to the future financing strategies, which enables us to increase our 
knowledge of the demand side of the financial contract, producing new insights (see also: 
Graham and Harvey, 2001). This approach is complementary to the research based on the 
observed financial outcomes, which utilises publicly available accounting data. Our approach 
matches our objectives; as we address the inter-relationship between ownership characteristics 
and financing strategies, an emphasis on actual observed outcomes would limit the analysis in 
this respect. This motivates our choice of survey-based methodology and use of survey data in 
empirical analysis. 
Our paper’s focus is on the potential financial constraints that emerged patterns of 
ownership and control may impose on the restructuring strategies of managers in transition 
firms. These constraints may be perceived as well as actual (such as a high level of debt that 
hinders access to new loans). However, the perceptions of managers are the ultimate factor 
shaping their decisions, and it is important to examine how these perceptions may correlate 
with corporate control characteristics. More specifically, we incorporate both observed 
company characteristics on one hand, and perceived restructuring investment financial 
strategies on the other.  
The richness of the survey data enables us to consider a finer-grained range of 
financing options, for instance, allowing to distinguish between domestic bank loans and 
borrowings from foreign credit institutions. The fact that such information cannot be obtained 
in the public domain supplies additional justification for choosing survey methodology. 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to provide empirical evidence on CEOs’ 
expectations regarding firms’ choice of investment finance, using a unique data set from a 
2001 survey of 157 large private Hungarian and Polish companies. Managers’ expectations of 
the importance of several types of long-term finance refer to the period 2001-2005 and are 
explicitly represented as a multidimensional construct, allowing for a correlation structure 
across five types of available, potentially interdependent financing sources. We believe that 
the model formulation that allows for the correlation between the perceived rankings of the 
financing sources is appropriate because any restrictions on the correlations are difficult to 
support on a priori ground. We develop our empirical model in Bayesian terms in order to 
address the problem of drawing inference from a small sample. Our model helps 
understanding how managers’ choice of financing sources may be affected by a number of 
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strategic and governance factors, such as the divestment strategy, ownership concentration, 
presence of domestic and foreign institutional investors and relationship links to banks, 
controlling for the firm’s size, performance and leverage. In addition, to check the robustness 
of our conclusions we investigate how the results of the Bayesian model compare with those 
obtained using classical methods. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the financial 
environment in Hungary and Poland. Section 3 reviews prior studies and develops a number 
of research propositions. Section 4 explains the design of our company survey and describes 
the resulting dataset. Section 5 introduces our approach to data analysis. Empirical results 
based on the Bayesian model are reported in Section 6, while Section 7 offers robustness 
checks based on the classical analysis. Section 8 offers a discussion and conclusions.    
 
2 Hungary and Poland: the financial environment in transition 
 
Rapid changes in the financial environment that have occurred during transition 
period, had important implications for companies that found themselves in a dire need of 
investment resources that could be used for restructuring and modernization. To allow a 
reliable analysis of the determinants of financing choices being made by the transition firm, 
researchers need firm-level data covering time periods representative of a sufficiently 
advanced stage of reform, when investment (as distinguished from reallocation) becomes 
again a crucial factor in restructuring and productivity enhancement. A pooled two-country 
sample of Hungarian and Polish companies in 2001 satisfies this important requirement. In an 
early phase of liberalisation of the 1990s, large productivity gains were achievable simply 
through a better use and reallocation of assets and did not necessitate high levels of 
investment. In addition, the existing evidence suggests that unlike in some other transition 
economies, the beginning of the new millennium saw most of the firms in Hungary and 
Poland facing hard budget constraints. In the year 2000, firms in these two countries had 
diverse industrial and corporate control structures while the two countries’ integration into the 
EU had considerably widened the range of potential sources of investment finance. At the 
time, both Hungary and Poland had relatively well functioning capital markets although these 
were much smaller in size than capital markets in the high-income OECD economies. Since 
the early 1990s, the Warsaw Stock Exchange was unique in the region as a new public finance 
market, in contrast to other transition countries where the stock exchanges mainly functioned 
as primary markets for privatisation related floatations (Glaeser et al., 2001). Capital markets 
in Hungary and Poland during the first decade of their operations were dominated by small 
dispersed investors who viewed companies’ reputation as important in providing finance. 
Although the banking sectors of both economies have experienced growth, the banking 
sectors’ size remained small while interest rates on loans stayed at relatively high levels (for 
overviews of Hungarian and Polish financial sectors see Carmignani 2003; Day and Taylor 
2004; Driffill and Mickiewicz 2003). Having opened the economy for foreign direct 
investment earlier than other transition countries, Hungary recorded high levels of foreign 
ownership in the enterprise sector. Poland, initially was lagging behind in this area, from the 
mid 1990s, showed acceleration in inflow of foreign capital and by 2001 had a significant 
foreign-owned industrial sector. 
In Hungary and Poland, privatisation was completed by a number of different methods 
leading to a wide variety of ownership and control structures2. Firm-level data from Hungary 
                                                          
2 See Mickiewicz and Baltowski (2003) and Major (2003) for the overviews of the Polish and Hungarian 
privatisation programmes, correspondingly and Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (2000); Megginson and Netter 
(2001); Djankov and Murell (2002), Mickiewicz (2005), and Andreff (2006) for comparative discussion. 
 5
and Poland in 2001 provides a required cross-section variation for an investigation of the 
associations between characteristics of ownership and control and the importance of finance 
sources.  
 
3 The relationships between corporate control and finance 
 
Prior research identifies a number of causal links between corporate control structures 
and long term financing choices made by the firm. A number of studies suggest that large 
block (outside) ownership may have a positive impact on the firm’s access to external sources 
of finance.  Companies may have large groups of undiversified shareholders that have both the 
incentives and the means to restrain the self-serving behaviour of managers, avoiding the free-
rider problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 754; see also Wruck 1989).  
However, the firm level governance factors should always be interpreted in the context 
of national corporate governance and legal frameworks. A rapidly developing “law and 
economics” research suggests that the firm’s financing strategies may be shaped by the extent 
to which minority investors are legally protected from the opportunistic behaviour of 
controlling shareholders. In countries where controlling shareholders are weakly constrained 
in their search of “private benefits of control”, firms with the dominant (majority) 
shareholders will differ in terms of their access to external finance from businesses where the 
distribution of share-ownership is more even.3 Where large investors gain full control over a 
company, they may follow their own interests, ‘which need not coincide with the interests of 
other investors in the firm … as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain 
nearly full control’ and may ‘prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are 
not shared by minority shareholders’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 758-9). Anticipating that, 
small investors may be less willing to buy the firm’s shares and, as a consequence, new equity 
issues are becoming less attractive to the dominant shareholder with legal control. In addition, 
the effect may be reinforced by expected implications of the new equity issue for the 
ownership structure: to retain their private benefits, dominant owners may not be willing to 
dilute already acquired legal control with newly issued shares. 
Thus, we may observe a non-linear effect of ownership concentration on managers’ 
choice of equity finance, which concurs with the argument in Morck et al., 1988. In general, 
companies with strategic owners with share ownership below the legal control threshold may 
be most interested in new equity finance. On one hand, they will be more attractive to 
investors than companies with dispersed ownership, due to perceived disciplining effects on 
managers. On the other hand, the investors may find these companies more attractive than 
those with fully concentrated ownership, due to a possibility of expropriation in the latter 
case. 
In addition to the level of ownership concentration, institutional and resource-
dependency theories emphasise that the identity of the large-block shareholder may have 
impact on financing sources of the firm. 
From resource dependency perspective, firms with foreign ownership may be less 
restricted in their access to external finance (Galindo and Schiantarelli, 2002; Harrison and 
McMillan, 2003; Mickiewicz et al., 2004; Bonaccorsi, 1992). More specifically, foreign 
owners may provide funds or make it easier to raise finance in the overseas capital markets 
and borrow from non-resident banks. 
In addition, the firm’s membership in financial-industrial (business) groups organised 
around domestic capital may facilitate access to both bank finance and government-sponsored 
                                                          
3 In the extreme case, when there is no effective protection of minority shareholders, the ownership will simply 
converge towards 100% owned by the controlling stakeholder, as minority shareholders will not be willing to 
buy any shares (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
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finance via formal and informal networks. These networks are usually cemented through the 
web of cross-shareholding, with the major shareholder being another domestic industrial 
corporation or a bank (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2001; Filatotchev and 
Mickiewicz, 2006). However, business groups in transition economies are notorious for their 
“opaqueness” and lack of transparency with regard to outside minority investors. Therefore, 
we expect that corporate and financial block-holders in transition economies will be 
associated with a higher reliance on bank finance and state support as opposed to equity 
investment. 
 
These links between governance characteristics of the firm and its financing strategies 
may be moderated by a number of firm-specific characteristics.  
 
Previous studies suggest that firm’s size is an important factor explaining financing 
choices. Size may serve as an inverse proxy for the extent of informational asymmetries 
between the firm’s insiders and external finance providers. Therefore larger firms are 
expected to be more capable of raising information-sensitive finance such as public equity or 
public debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Keasey and Watson, 1993; Jarvis, 2000). Smaller 
firms face tighter constraints (Schiantarelli 1996; Colombo and Driffill, 2003). The empirical 
evidence on the positive links between size and access to external finance is provided by 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Bernanke et al. (1994). However, Hu 
and Schiantarelli (1994) and Kadapakkam et al. (1998) report opposite results. It follows that 
the link between size and financing options may be specific to macroeconomic conditions, 
institutional structures and the nature of the financial intermediation (Lamont et al., 2001). 
 
In terms of the performance effects on financing choices, high profitability leads to 
more internal funds and, if interest rates on borrowings are high, profitable firms will show 
preference for financing with retained earnings and demand less credit (De Hass and Peeters, 
2004). This behaviour is consistent with the ‘pecking order’ theory of financing (Myers, 
1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991).  
 
In addition, the firm’s intention to divest may be a proxy for financial distress 
accompanied by defensive restructuring. Divestment may indicate ‘defensive restructuring’ 
and downsizing in firms that are less efficient in active adaptation to the market environment 
(Carlin et al. 2001b) or financially distressed. Undergoing restructuring firms may also seek 
access to fresh finance in order to stay in business, but divestment may be taken as negative 
signal by external providers of finance making it more difficult to obtain. 
 
In sum, previous research indicates the importance of such factors as ownership 
concentration, owner identity, firm size, profitability, intentions to divest and close 
relationships with banks and industrial partners in terms of their effects on the relevance to 
financing preferences of the transition firm. Empirical relationships may be then interpreted in 
light of the theoretical arguments of agency theory and institutional framework.  
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4  Sample description and variables 
 
For our analysis, we use a data set that has been generated by a questionnaire survey of 
large private companies in Hungary and Poland carried out in the 2001. The companies were 
drawn from the population of large private non-financial companies as defined by reliable 
public sources. A list of the top 500, by turnover, companies produced by the Institute of 
Economics of the Polish Academy of Sciences and published by Rzeczpospolita, a top broad-
sheet, covering finance and business law, was employed as a frame for random sampling of 
Polish firms, while the Hungarian firms were drawn at random from a list of the top 200 
companies complied by the Figyelo magazine. The survey resulted in 157 useable 
questionnaires, representing 100 Polish and 57 Hungarian firms. The generalisation of our 
results is limited by the fact that the sample characteristics divert in some respects from the 
population characteristics. This is related to the fact that the sectoral structure of our sample 
does not corresponds entirely to the population structure (for definitions of sectors, see Table 
1 below). In particular, services and construction companies are underrepresented (7% of the 
sample versus 37% in the population) and both labour intensive branches and high technology 
branches are over represented (36% in our sample versus 23% in the population for the first 
category; 27% versus 16% for the second category). In turn, the percentage of firms in both 
heavy industry (5% versus 4% in population) and resource-intensive industries (20% versus 
17% in population) is similar. The sectoral characteristics imply that on average, our firms are 
smaller in terms of sales (as services including trade are under represented) but larger in terms 
of employment (as labour intensive branches are over represented). On the other hand, the 
percentage of firms with some foreign presence is not that different: 62% in the sample, 
versus 72% in the population of largest companies. We have no population data on ownership 
concentration to compare with our sample. 
Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 1. Median 
employment values are 596 for Poland and 542 for Hungary, but the distributions are skewed 
due to the presence of a few very large companies, especially in the Hungarian sub-sample, 
where the largest company had 15,599 employees at the end of 2000. For that reason the 
mean employment values are higher than the medians for both sub-samples, being 907 for 
Poland and 1,403 for Hungary. Distributions of the two measures of size in 2000, in terms of 
assets and turnover, have similar shapes with the median values being higher for Poland than 
for Hungary, while the opposite is true for the mean values. Based on the full sample the 
median turnover was US$37.7 million while the median value of total assets was US$26.4 
million (at book values).  
 
Credible investigators from the Research Department of the Polish Sociological 
Society and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science were pivotal to 
the implementation of the survey. The two teams conducted in their respective countries face-
to-face interviews, seeking chief executive officers’ views on assess to finance and collating 
information on other company key characteristics. Both country teams have extensive 
research experience in enterprise surveys, possess good practical knowledge about intra-
company personal relations and use a wide range of response-enhancing techniques. In 
comparison with some other post-communist countries, especially the CIS countries, 
company accessibility for conducting survey-based academic research in Poland and Hungary 
has been good, especially in the case of largest firms, which are generally more accustomed to 
openness than smaller enterprises.  
When designing and testing the questionnaire, one important concern was to address a 
possible problem of sensitivity of owners and managers towards a number of items related to 
ownership and control structures. Most reports from surveys of enterprises in the transition 
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countries suggest that up to 10-15% of interviewees may refuse to co-operate and provide 
answers. Item non-response rates in our interview survey were of similar magnitudes, giving 
rise to the issue of appropriate treatment for missing data in a subsequent data analysis. Fewer 
difficulties were encountered by our investigators in relation to the questionnaire items 
dealing with financial performance and position of firms since in both countries company 
reports are available to external parties and under the adopted regulations large firms disclose 
sufficiently detailed and reliable accounting information. 
 
We employ three measures of corporate control (Table 1). Ownership concentration is 
expressed in terms of the largest shareholder’s stake. The sample firms have a high degree of 
ownership concentration. In the full sample, the dominant owner controls on average 62.5% 
of shares while the largest shareholders have a 69.8% stake in a Hungarian firm and a 58.8% 
stake in a Polish firm. 
The binary variables ‘foreign presence’ and ‘largest shareholder being domestic 
institutional investor’ add further two dimensions of corporate control. In our sample, 62.4% 
of firms have foreign owners while domestic institutional investors hold the majority stake in 
31.4% of firms. 
We constructed the performance measure as the average profitability over previous 
three years based on the ratio of earnings before taxes (but after financing expenses) to total 
revenues. We observe skewed profitability distributions due to a small number of companies 
reporting high profitability. In particular, in 1988-2000, Hungarian companies demonstrated 
higher profitability than Polish firms, with median values being respectively 1.51% and 
0.26%.  
Financial position is defined in terms of overall indebtedness since balance sheet data 
necessary for separating long- and short-term debt obligations was unavailable.  We proxy 
indebtedness by the ratio of total liabilities over total assets measured at book values. The 
distribution of the indebtedness variable is clearly non-normal. While the median values for 
the country sub-samples are similar, the means values differ. In the Hungarian sub-sample, 
the mean is smaller than the median due to the presence of several firms with relatively low 
indebtedness. For the full sample, the median is 56.1% and corresponding values for Hungary 
and Poland are 57.4% and 54.7%. 
 Managers’ strategic choices of various sources of investment finance are in the focus 
of our study. However, reporting standards in transition economies do not provide a detailed 
breakdown of internally and externally generated investment resources. More specifically, 
company reports do not differentiate between foreign and domestic lenders, and they do not 
provide any indication of state financial support. Another difficulty is associated with our 
focus on managers’ strategic intent, whereas company reports provide data on strategic 
outcomes, such as debt-to-equity ratio, total debt, etc. 
 To overcome these problems we used perceptional data generated by managers’ 
responses to questions about the importance of various sources of finance for their future 
investment projects. The data set includes an array of ordinal categorical variables that 
measure the relative importance of alternative sources of finance for investment and capture 
intentions to divest. This is achieved by drawing upon the items reflecting perceptions of 
chief executive officers of the sample firms on the importance of finance types in funding 
modernisation (investment) programmes planned by their firms. The importance of internally 
generated funds is analysed by investigating the roles of retained earnings (profits). 
Intentions to overcome financial distress and to raise funds via divestment are represented by 
the two indicators, selling stakes in other firms and selling or leasing out buildings and 
equipment. In addition, we have information on the degree of access to external funds via 
issues of equity and corporate bonds, and also by borrowing from local (domestic) and 
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foreign banks, support from the state, and credit from industrial partners. A common Likert 
7-point scale, running from ‘1’ not important to ‘7’ high importance, was used to reflect 
managers’ assessment.  
 The overall pattern of relative importance of finance sources for the sample companies 
in both countries is very similar. Retained earnings (the average score = 5.15) followed by 
credit from local banks (the average score = 4.17) were identified as the two most important 
sources of finance for investment. This is consistent with macroeconomic data, which 
demonstrate that both Poland and Hungary evolve towards bank-based financial systems 
(EBRD, 2006). For both countries the third most important source of finance is sell-off or 
leasing of assets (2.29), which indicates that privatised companies are actively seeking to 
restructure and overcome the legacy of asset composition inherited from the communist 
period.4 Next comes state support for investment (2.01) provided presumably under industry 
sector restructuring programmes and credit from foreign banks (2.01). Somewhat less 
important roles are played by equity issues (1.89) and financial restructuring via sell-off of 
shareholdings in other companies (1.66). The two least important sources of finance are credit 
from industrial partners (1.45) and issue of corporate bonds (1.40). 
  
 
5  Methods 
 
Managers’ preferences with regard to future strategies for generating new finance 
represent a multidimensional decision-making process that involves choices between internal 
source of finance (retained earnings) and external sources of equity, debt and support 
extended by the state. The questionnaire design also allows for the further fine-tuned analysis 
of external debt decisions by differentiating between the issuance of corporate bonds, loans 
from local and foreign banks and credit from industrial partners. For a company that 
undergoes restructuring and is involved in complex operations, a viable strategy might be 
based on raising new finance simultaneously from a variety of sources. A modernisation 
programme may rarely be accomplished by using just one type of new funds with the 
implication that some combinations of sources may be viewed by the company’s manager as 
complimentary, while other options may being competing with each other. It seems possible 
that in assessing on an ordinal scale the relative importance of individual sources of funds, the 
manager could envisage various combinations, which in turn leads to the statistical 
dependence between the rankings given to individual types of finance. A joint analysis of 
accessibility of individual sources of funds is required, and this suggests statistical framework 
that takes into account possible inter-dependence between the scores assigned to individual 
sources.  
   
Our primary interest is focused on the impact on financing policy decisions of a 
number of relevant plausible factors suggested by prior studies into company finance for the 
transition context. In examining the effects of firm-specific attributes such as ownership and 
control structures, banking relations, size, performance and indebtedness we further add to the 
vector of covariates the controls for intentions to sell /divest surplus assets and for sectoral 
and country differences.  
In the light of the interrelations between financing polices, the importance of a finance 
type is related not only to similar firm-specific features, but also directly to the accessibility of 
other sources of funds. The natural technique for modelling jointly interdependent decisions 
                                                          
4 The ranking reported here is consistent with findings by Carlin et al. (2001a) for privatised companies (see 
Table 10 there). In addition Carlin et al. (2001a) explore in more detail the underlying reasons of financial 
constraints (collateral, high lending rates, paperwork/bureaucracy etc.), see Table 11 there. 
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on modernisation finance is a system of equations with dependent variables capturing the 
importance of individual sources of funds and allowing for a general correlation structure 
across financing options. 
 
The endogeneity of the ownership variables is always a problem when one uses cross-
sectional data. However, our ownership variables are measured in period T, whereas 
managers’ expectations are related to year T+1 and beyond. In other words, our research 
design assumes at least one period lag between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables, including ownership variables, which reduces the endogeniety problem. We 
emphasize that we do not claim solving the endogeneity problem, but our research design 
helps to mitigate it. Conceivably, there could be a feedback from the expectations of financing 
to ownership, in which case using lags would not eliminate the problem entirely. However, 
we think that a strong feedback of this kind is unlikely. 
  
As is the case with many survey studies, missingness in data in a form of incomplete 
records becomes a problem. If the data is missing on random (which in fact implies the data is 
more reliable), any application of multivariable estimator results in serious reduction in 
records available, as the cumulative effect of missingness in many variables eliminates a 
significant amount of available information, which could be used for estimation. For this 
reason we apply a Bayesian approach, where all available information is utilised. 
Subsequently (in Section 7) we provide robustness checks based on classical estimators. 
Detailed discussion of the Bayesian methodology is provided in Appendix. To reflect the 
ordinal and correlated nature of our dependent variables we employ a simultaneous model for 
ordered outcomes using the factor analysis formulation for modelling ordinal correlated data 
(see, e.g., Song and Lee, 2001). In our probability model we set vague normal priors with zero 
means and large variances for the regression coefficients β so as to let the data dominate the 
form of the posterior distributions. As a result, our Bayesian estimates are at least as 
conservative as those obtained using classical methods. 
 
 
6 Results based on the Bayesian model 
 
The Likert-scale questionnaire provides us with data on the choice from the nine 
potential sources of finance for modernisation investment programmes (see ranking of 
answers in terms of mean values at the end of Section 4). We treat asset divestment as a 
control variable, which leaves us with eight potential choices of finance. We run two models, 
one with all dimensions and one with only five most popular financial options retained. The 
results for the full model do not differ significantly from the smaller model, as the three least 
popular options add very little in terms of significant results. While they are available on 
request, because of space constraints, we present only the results for the model with five 
simultaneous equations: for retained earnings, loans from the domestic banking sector, loans 
from abroad, public equity finance, and government sponsored finance. 
 
Tables 2A and 2B present the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) output. The 
posterior distributions of regression coefficients are summarised in terms of their means and 
95% Bayes credible intervals. In each dimension, inference is based on the last 100,000 
samples with a 60,000 burn-in.  
 
Consistent with our expectations discussed in Section 3, public equity issues are less 
likely both in the case of the firms where the dominant shareholder owns 50-100% (legal 
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control) and by the firms with the most dispersed ownership (below 25%).  This may be due 
to two different yet complementary reasons.  
First, the CEOs of companies in the 25-49% ownership concentration group anticipate 
highest market demand for new shares, as compared both with the companies with highly 
dispersed ownership and with the companies with legal control. In this group characterised by 
moderate concentration, the positive effect of enhanced monitoring is not yet outweighed by 
the expropriation risk perceptions of equity investors and that makes equity issues attractive. 
Second, owners with legal control may be hesitant to issue shares as that could be 
associated with loss of benefits of control resulting from share dilution.5 This second 
interpretation is consistent with earlier survey evidence that control is of considerable value to 
managers and owners in transition economies (Filatotchev et al., 1999). 
While our results are in line with the literature which points to non-linearities caused 
by ownership concentration (Morck et al., 1988), in addition they specifically point out to the 
importance of the legal control (50%) ownership threshold (see also further robustness checks 
in the next section). This is entirely in line with new results obtained for Western European 
economies, which demonstrate similarly that control thresholds are important (Kirchmaier and 
Grant, 2005). 
 
We obtain several other results. 
 
In terms of the effects of the identity of large-block holders on financing choices, 
having a domestic institutional investor as the dominant owner raises CEOs’ expectations to 
borrow from the local banks, and also to access state finance. Additionally, we fund that 
presence of foreign investors facilitates access to bank finance from abroad. 
 
In terms of the firm’s characteristics, size has a positive effect on managers’ 
preference for public equity issues, which are most sensitive to information asymmetries, as 
expected. Parallel to that, past profitability, which may also be seen as a proxy for expected 
future returns, is also significantly associated with access to public equity finance. 
Interestingly, the same two results hold for the provision of finance from abroad, where the 
effect of past profitability is significant and positive, while the effect of size is positive and 
marginally insignificant. The results for these two firm-level factors are consistent with 
general findings on firm’s characteristics attracting foreign investment (Kang and Stultz 1997; 
Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001; Bishop et al. 2002). 
 
The reported parameter estimates imply that the importance of retained earnings 
increases with profitability of firms, in line with the ‘pecking order’ perspective.  
 
Sectoral affiliation plays an important role in shaping managerial expectations about 
future options of long-term financing. Firms in heavy industry (the omitted reference category 
in Table 2) are least likely to rely on retained earnings, which one would expect given their 
low profitability. Also, Polish companies’ managers are less optimistic about availability of 
retained earnings. 
 
 
7 Robustness checks: ordered probit results 
 
 In this section we offer a comparison of the results obtained from the Bayesian model, 
with those based on the standard regression methodology. Given, the reduced size of the 
                                                          
5 We are indebted to the anonymous referee for the discussion of this issue. 
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sample, the implementation of a more ambitious multi-equation model is impractical. 
Therefore, we restrict ourselves to the series of parallel ordered probit estimations (on 
methodology, see: Wooldridge, 2002 or Greene, 2003).  
When the standard regression methodology is applied, due to incomplete records, the 
specifications based on the same set of variables reduce our sample from 157 to 83 firms, 
which confirms the methodological issue discussed in Section 5. Clearly, a significant amount 
of information is lost in the classical analysis of survey data.  
The results are illustrated with Tables 3 and 4 below. Table 3 replicates the 
specifications adopted for the Bayesian model. Table 4 presents further robustness checks for 
the determinants of public equity financing, where we alternate the construction of the 
ownership concentration variable. 
 
Our main interest is in the link between ownership concentration and financial strategy 
based on equity finance for new investment. The pattern we obtained using the Bayesian 
model holds, with financial strategy based on the equity finance being most characteristic for 
ownership concentration in the range of 25-49% percent. While this category taken alone is 
now marginally insignificant at 10% level, all concentration categories taken together remain 
significant at 1%. 
To test the robustness of these results further, we experimented with other 
specifications changing the definition of the concentration variables. The emerging pattern is 
that when ordered by the significance level, the specifications based on the categorisation 
dominate those based on continuous ones (linear and polynominal).  
With respect to the continuous specifications, the cubic specification is jointly 
significant at 10% level (with all terms negative), and the quadratic specification is significant 
at 5% level, with the linear term positive and the quadratic term negative, leading to a 
maximum positive effect on equity issues around 13% held by largest shareholder. However, 
both of these specifications are dominated by a simple linear specification, which comes with 
negative sign (significant at 5%). The latter one we report as specification (4) in Table 4. 
However, the linear continuous specification is in turn dominated by the specifications 
based on the categorisations. 
With respect to the categorisation, we changed our first cut-off to 20% (consistent 
with the fact, that block ownership of 20% of shares triggers some shareholders’ rights, 
including board representation), however the results are less significant (unreported). In 
addition, while 25% threshold remains important (but should still be taken as 
approximation!), the 75% is not; this is consistent with Bayesian results, where the latter cut-
off point was also not significant.  
In fact, the most significant specification we obtained is with just one dummy variable 
representing the 25%-49% category, with a positive coefficient (reported as specification (1) 
in Table 4). This result is even sharper than the Bayesian results.  In the latter case, there was 
a significant difference between this category and the benchmark 0%-24% category. Here we 
cannot reject a hypothesis that 25%-49% category is associated with more equity finance than 
both lower and higher levels of concentration of shares. 
 
Summarizing these results, we found additional support for the significance of the 
legal threshold level, that is, dominant shareholders with legal control are far less interested in 
new equity issues as financing strategy. In addition, a second result holds. That is, equity 
issues are also more attractive for owners with some degree of concentration than for those 
with very small holdings, i.e. where ownership structure is very disperse. We interpret this as 
consistent with the stronger demand from investors, which makes equity issues more 
attractive. Investors prefer a situation, where a strategic owner exert some monitoring role and 
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may have impact on restructuring strategy, but on the other hand does not have legal control, 
which could result in abuse of minority shareholders. 
 
 All other results of the Bayesian model are also supported, with one interesting 
exception. We obtained a significant positive effect of close links with a leading bank on 
financing strategy based on bank credit. In contrast, in the Bayesian model, the same variable 
had a negative significant effect. The explanation of this apparent contradiction may relate to 
the fact that the Bayesian model estimates all the financing outcomes jointly. While presence 
of leading banks could facilitate access to credit finance, it may also have an additional 
stronger effect, as leading banks have more influence on the firm’s capital structure choices 
and may encourage their clients to adopt a more balanced capital structures (see Kayhan and 
Titman, 2007). This is the latter effect that may drive a change of sign in the multi-equation 
Bayesian model. 
 
8 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Results from our multidimensional analysis support stylised facts with regard to the 
choice of investment finance in the transition countries with not yet fully developed financial 
systems. They also emphasise the important roles of corporate governance variables. 
 
Our findings indicate that managers’ preferences for financing sources are sensitive to 
the degree of ownership concentration, and this relationship is not a continuous one, being 
strongly affected by the legal control threshold (50%). Companies with ownership 
concentration within the range of 25-49% expect high demand from the providers of public 
equity finance, supporting agency arguments developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). We 
see this result as our contribution to the literature, as most of the existing empirical evidence 
on the link between ownership, performance and finance applies to the companies quoted on 
the US stock exchange. In the financial and institutional environment we discuss, the 
incentive effect seems initially to go hand in hand with concentration of ownership, but 
become clearly dominated by entrenchment effects once as the dominant owner acquires legal 
control. 
 
In addition, we find that owners’ identity influences the perceived importance of 
financing sources, namely, companies with presence of foreign investors find access to 
finance from abroad more easily, while domestic institutional investors expect easier access to 
domestic bank loans and to state sponsored finance. 
 
We also identified a number of firm-level characteristics that affects managers’ 
financing strategies. Significance of size and past profitability variables may be explained by 
the presence of investors concerns with informational asymmetries and associated agency 
costs. In addition, our results are consistent with the standard ‘pecking order’ theory. 
 
By focusing on the governance effects on investment decisions, we have extended 
further previous research that was mainly focused on bilateral links between governance 
factors and the debt versus equity choice. Our analysis suggest that the firm’s ownership 
characteristics, such as ownership concentration and owners’ identity may have simultaneous 
effects on a wide range of managers’ financing options that include internal and external 
sources of finance. 
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Our findings have important implications for investors and policy-makers in transition 
economies. Firms competing within transition economies face a ‘high velocity’ environment 
of rapid political, economic, and institutional changes that are accompanied by relatively 
underdeveloped factor and product markets. These environmental uncertainties with which 
firms must deal if they want to survive in the long run create the need for upgrading and re-
configuring existing resources and capabilities. The EU accession process and 
internationalization of transition economies such as Poland and Hungary imposed new 
demands on domestic firms to develop their dynamic capabilities that enable them to take 
advantage of new opportunities, including gaining access to new product markets. In this 
context, having timely access to a variety of financing sources may be a pre-requisite of the 
firm’s survival and growth. However, our research shows that the range of managers’ 
strategic choices is contingent on governance factors.6   Retaining benefits of control still 
appears to play an important role in decisions to raise external finance, as owners with legal 
control tend to rely less on equity finance. It implies that further corporate governance reforms 
related to enforcement of minority shareholders rights may lead to more efficient financing 
structures. In addition the presence of the strong links between domestic companies and domestic 
banks suggests that there is a scope for enhancing competition in the banking sector that could 
result in further diversification in sources of loan finance and lead to improved and more even 
conditions for financing of enterprises. We expect that the progress of financial integration 
enhanced by the EU accession will have positive impact in this respect. 
 
                                                          
6 We are indebted to the anonymous referee for the discussion of these points. 
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APPENDIX: Methodological discussion 
 
In this study, we use a Bayesian approach for analysing ordinal response data obtained 
from the survey. A fundamental strength of Bayesian modelling is that posterior parameter 
estimates are assumed to have a distribution and therefore give more realistic picture of 
uncertainty. Other natural advantages over the modelling strategy relying on asymptotic 
theory include: (i) avoiding the assumption of infinite amounts of forthcoming data; (ii) the 
potential for handling missing values as part of the estimation process; (iii) a direct 
interpretation of posterior credible intervals for model parameters and (iv) finite sample 
results (see, e.g., Gilks et al., 1996; Gill, 2002; Congdon, 2003; Greene, 2003). In the  
Bayesian framework, the likelihood of the observed data with given model parameters, is used 
to modify the prior beliefs and the update knowledge is then summarised in a posterior 
distribution (for details see, e.g., Spiegelhalter et al., 2000; Congdon, 2003). The main 
variables of interest in our analysis are regression coefficients of explanatory and control 
variables. The posterior distributions of these parameters obtained using MCMC methods are 
summarised in the next section in terms of means and credible intervals.  
An advantage of Bayesian modelling is that missing values are treated as another set 
of unknown quantities which facilitates the estimation of a model, involving explanatory 
covariates with incomplete records since the model specifies the prior distributions for all 
unknown quantities and the likelihood for the data. As discussed in Section 4, our survey data 
contains missing values resulting from the failure to obtain answers to some individual items, 
however we should note that the incomplete data problem is not acute with average item non-
response rates being in order of 10-15 per cent. Simply deleting companies with missing 
values from the analysis would have reduced dramatically the number of data points available 
for fitting a model. Given that in our data set missingness occurs at relatively low rates, a 
reasonable strategy is to base a missing covariate imputation model on a missing completely 
at random mechanism7 with appropriate prior distributions being specified for the covariates 
with incomplete records to generate samples for missing data. We emphasise that all 
continuous covariates are standardised to reduce correlation in posteriors and improve 
numerical stability in running MCMC simulations. The probabilistic structure of a 
standardised covariate with incomplete records is then accommodated by using the standard 
normal as a suitable uninformative prior. Missingness in categorical covariates is modelled by 
choosing categorical prior distributions with equal frequencies in the levels used for 
categorisation. Thus despite the constraints on the completeness of data, the richness of 
qualitative information, gained by the survey, enables us to get a further insight into the firm-
specific, industry-level and economy-wide factors underlying access to finance in Hungarian 
and Polish firms. 
 To reflect in modelling the ordinal and correlated nature of our dependent variables we 
employ a simultaneous model for ordered outcomes using the factor analysis formulation for 
modelling ordinal correlated data (see, e.g., Song and Lee, 2001).  
 
We observe a J-dimensional ordinal outcome on J types of financing sources. For each of n 
observations (firms), i=1,...,n, the values of  J ordinal responses are recorded in the vector  
 
Let Jj≥2 represent the number of categories for the jth response, j=1,...,Jj, and let  
denote the k-dimensional covariate vector of ith observation. 
                                                          
7 Data are missing completely at random when the missing data values are a simple random sample of all data values (see 
Little and Rubin, 1987). 
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Ordered outcomes are modelled by introducing an underlying, latent, continuous structure.  
 
If we denote by   
 
 
the vector of latent continuous responses (specialized factors) that results in observed 
categorical responses y i  , then the unknown thresholds θlj determine the observed category for 
yij as follows: 
 
 
The likelihood model for latent data Zi is formulated in terms of covariate effects and 
stochastic disturbances. If we let the mean of the underlying distribution of latent data µij  
depend on explanatory covariates xi, we obtain the regression representation  
 
 
 
with the restrictions β0=0 and θ1=0 to ensure that the mean of a latent construct is identified. 
   
To reflect in modelling the correlated preferences regarding J possible financing sources, 
latent data Zij  are assigned a multivariate normal distribution to specify multivariate 
dependence between the specialized underlying factors: 
 
  
where Σ is an unconstrained covariance matrix with J(1+(J-1)/2) free parameters.  
 
 The cumulative probabilities τij are easily computable using the Probit link:  
 
 
 
Therefore, the probability of observation i being classified in an intermediate category lj is 
given by differencing the cumulative probabilities of scoring category lj or less, and of scoring 
category lj-1 or less: 
 
 
We achieve sampling for the observed, ordinal indicator yij by using a categorical distribution 
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To complete the full probability model specification we set vague normal priors with zero 
means and large variances for the regression coefficients β so as to let the data dominate the 
form of the posterior distributions. The ordering of the thresholds corresponding to the ordinal 
categories is obtained by setting truncated normal densities as the priors on the thresholds. An 
inverse-Wishart prior is declared for the variance-covariance matrix Σ. 
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Table 1: Variable description and descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) 
 
Mnemonic Definition Full Sample Poland Hungary 
  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Covariates         
domestic_instit_investor Largest shareholder = domestic institutional investor (industrial company or financial 
institution), a dummy variable 
121 .31 .47 .31 .47 .32 .47 
foreign_presence Presence of foreign investor 157 .62 .49 .59 .49 .68 .47 
leading_bank One or two leading banks, a dummy variable 135 .20 .40 .23 .42 .14 .35 
largest_shareholding_% Proportion of  shares held by the largest shareholder (per cent) 122 62.46 32.60 58.77 33.81 69.76 29.09 
ebt/sales_(2000) Earnings before taxes (‘gross profit’) over sales, average for 1998-2000, percentage 129 2.16 8.83 .90 8.98 5.08 7.80 
debt/assets_(2000) Ratio of debt to total assets in 2000: (assets less shareholders funds)/assets 125 .52 .40 .56 .28 .44 .60 
employment_size _(2000) Employment in 2000 137 1063 1771 907 86 1404 2891 
ind_heavy Heavy industry (ISIC: <14 and 27) 152 .05 .22 .02 .14 .10 .31 
ind_labour_intensive Labour intensive industry (ISIC: 15-20 and 36) 152 .36 .48 .38 .49 .33 .48 
ind_resource_intensive Resource intensive industry (ISIC: 21-26) 152 .21 .41 .19 .39 .25 .43 
ind_med&high_technology Medium and high technology industry (ISIC: 28-35) 152 .34 .47 .34 .47 .33 .48 
ind_services Services and construction (ISIC: 45, 50-52, >55) 152 .05 .22 .08 .28 .00 .00 
divest Binary indicator of importance of divestment. It takes one if the average score of ordinal 
indicators ‘sale or leasing of assets’ and ‘sale of shareholdings in other companies ≥ 4. 
141 .11 .32 .15 .36 .04 .20 
Indicators of Importance of Financing Source a  
fin_sale_of_assets Sale or Leasing of Assets 142 2.29 1.81 2.24 1.76 2.37 1.91 
fin_sale_of_shares Sale of shareholdings in other companies 141 1.66 1.47 1.57 1.29 1.84 1.76 
fin_retained_earnings Retained Earnings 142 5.15 1.92 5.37 1.85 4.76 2.00 
fin__domestic_bank_credit Bank Credit, Domestic 142 4.17 2.11 4.34 2.14 3.84 2.03 
fin_foreign_bank_credit Bank Credit, Foreign 142 2.01 1.75 1.87 1.65 2.26 1.91 
fin_industrial_partners Credit from industrial partners 141 1.45 1.23 1.51 1.32 1.35 1.03 
fin_state_support State Support 141 2.01 1.72 1.88 1.70 2.24 1.75 
fin_issue_of_equity Issue of Equity 138 1.89 1.62 1.76 1.36 2.15 2.01 
fin_issue_of_bonds Issue of Bonds 138 1.40 1.16 1.35 1.11 1.49 1.26 
 
 
 
 
a Assessed on a 7-level Likert scale, with ‘1’ denoting ‘not important’ 
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Table 2A. Results of the simultaneous model for ordered outcomes (Bayesian) 
 
 Retained earnings Domestic bank loans Foreign bank loans Public equity State support 
  Credible interval 
end points 
 Credible interval 
end points 
 Credible interval 
end points 
 Credible interval 
end points 
 Credible interval 
end points 
Variables: Mean 2.50% 97.50% Mean 2.50% 97.50% Mean 2.50% 97.50% Mean 2.50% 97.50% Mean 2.50% 97.50% 
assets_2000 -0.050 -0.163 0.061 -0.061 -0.201 0.142 0.042 -0.104 0.189 0.284 0.051 0.524 -0.170 -0.423 0.064 
aver_ebt/sales (98-2000) 0.686 0.395 0.847 0.106 -0.052 0.282 0.517 0.358 0.725 -0.428 -0.598 -0.209 0.079 -0.193 0.352 
debt/assets_2000 -0.162 -0.342 0.091 0.072 -0.142 0.253 0.178 -0.084 0.396 0.004 -0.283 0.219 -0.032 -0.204 0.239 
Divest -1.222 -1.599 -0.944 -0.750 -1.079 -0.331 0.022 -0.429 0.484 -0.045 -0.818 0.610 0.156 -0.633 0.704 
Domestic_inst_investor 0.370 -0.083 0.904 0.866 0.325 1.241 -0.314 -0.817 0.134 -0.788 -1.079 -0.494 0.682 0.244 1.209 
foreign_presence -0.119 -0.425 0.234 -0.050 -0.384 0.256 0.718 0.285 0.935 -0.475 -0.810 -0.196 -0.091 -0.487 0.286 
leading_bank -0.001 -0.563 0.459 -0.447 -0.766 -0.094 -0.119 -1.307 0.341 0.341 -0.121 0.737 0.213 -0.157 0.612 
Largest  shareholder’s share (omitted benchmark category: 0-24%): 
25-49% -0.125 -0.658 0.353 -0.100 -0.507 0.263 -0.075 -0.549 0.604 0.727 0.252 1.086 0.154 -0.215 0.487 
50-74% -0.342 -0.946 -0.006 -0.081 -0.466 0.216 -0.640 -0.965 -0.290 -0.241 -0.653 0.444 -1.526 -1.887 -0.919 
75-100% -0.050 -0.461 0.231 0.384 -0.009 0.750 0.309 -0.091 0.774 -0.233 -0.823 0.213 -0.665 -0.999 -0.317 
Industrial sector (omitted benchmark category: heavy industry and mining): 
ind_labour_intensive 1.607 1.045 2.241 0.751 0.426 1.001 -1.275 -1.603 -0.899 -0.836 -1.151 -0.542 0.351 -0.117 0.735 
ind_resource_intensive 1.841 1.470 2.325 0.989 0.530 1.404 -0.433 -0.974 -0.063 -1.215 -1.606 -0.723 0.321 -0.412 1.348 
ind_services 2.254 1.548 2.916 1.262 0.554 1.865 -0.112 -0.941 0.789 -2.023 -3.533 -0.443 0.690 -0.169 1.480 
ind_med&high_tech 1.598 1.339 1.967 0.395 0.027 0.779 -0.876 -1.268 -0.522 -0.142 -0.816 0.400 0.574 0.182 0.988 
Poland -0.363 -0.627 -0.118 0.203 -0.205 0.552 0.186 -0.052 0.435 0.562 0.161 0.895 -1.091 -1.448 -0.802 
 
Notes: (i) Number of observations: 157; (ii) Credible intervals that exclude zero are in bold.
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Table 2.B: Variance-covariance Matrix Σ  
 
  
Retained  
Earnings 
Domestic  
Bank 
Loans 
Foreign   
Bank 
Loans  
 
Public 
Equity 
 
State  
Support 
 
Retained Earnings 
 
0.012 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.050 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.066 
      
Domestic Bank Loans  0.318* 0.344* 0.437* 0.475* 
      
Foreign Bank Loans   0.385* 0.469* 0.524* 
      
Public Equity    0.645* 0.663* 
      
State Support     0.732* 
 
 
Note: credible intervals that exclude zero are marked with an asterisk. 
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Table 3. Results of the ordered probit models (classical) 
 
  Retained earnings Domestic bank loans Foreign bank loans Public equity State support 
    Robust     Robust     Robust     Robust     Robust   
Variables: Coef. Std.Err. P>z Coef. Std.Err. P>z Coef. Std.Err. P>z Coef. Std.Err. P>z Coef. Std.Err. P>z
assets_2000 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.81 -0.01 0.01 0.18
av_ebt/sales (98-00)  3.59 1.30 0.01 2.27 1.12 0.04 5.12 1.98 0.01 -2.10 1.25 0.09 -1.48 1.63 0.37
debt/assets_2000  -1.14 0.62 0.07 -0.28 0.39 0.48 0.16 0.34 0.64 -0.04 0.28 0.88 0.05 0.31 0.87
divest  -1.23 0.41 0.00 -0.66 0.47 0.16 -0.02 0.47 0.96 -0.11 0.55 0.84 -0.14 0.41 0.74
domest_inst_investor 0.09 0.36 0.81 0.85 0.32 0.01 -0.36 0.36 0.32 0.07 0.44 0.88 0.21 0.43 0.63
foreign_presence  -0.83 0.36 0.02 0.08 0.33 0.81 0.32 0.35 0.36 -0.12 0.41 0.77 -0.21 0.38 0.58
leading_bank 0.03 0.42 0.95 0.81 0.37 0.03 0.14 0.42 0.74 0.55 0.35 0.12 0.96 0.40 0.02
largest shareholder's share (omitted category: 0-24%): 
25-49% -0.33 0.51 0.52 0.24 0.48 0.61 0.95 0.58 0.10 0.77 0.54 0.16 0.46 0.52 0.38
50-75% -0.70 0.54 0.20 0.05 0.51 0.92 0.09 0.59 0.87 -0.69 0.69 0.32 -1.51 0.64 0.02
75-100% -0.42 0.46 0.37 0.46 0.46 0.32 0.50 0.52 0.34 -0.51 0.46 0.27 -0.48 0.43 0.26
industrial sector (omitted category: heavy industry and mining): 
ind_labour_intensive  0.32 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.34 -1.70 0.62 0.01 -1.26 1.06 0.24 -0.35 0.87 0.69
ind_resource_intens 0.60 0.54 0.26 0.69 0.55 0.21 -0.81 0.57 0.16 -1.00 1.07 0.35 0.10 0.96 0.92
ind_services 1.37 0.68 0.04 1.46 1.15 0.21 -0.66 1.21 0.58 -8.82 1.13 0.00 -7.39 0.95 0.00
ind_med&high_tech 0.14 0.43 0.74 0.22 0.47 0.64 -1.15 0.56 0.04 -0.37 1.06 0.73 -0.17 0.89 0.85
poland  -0.79 0.35 0.02 -0.29 0.33 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.65 -0.25 0.46 0.58 -1.88 0.37 0.00
Number of observ 85     85     85     83     85     
Wald chi2 57     21     30     1410     1299     
Pseudo R2 0.148     0.057     0.148     0.112     0.171     
 
Notes: (i) Public equity finance: three variables for largest shareholder’s shares are jointly significant at p=0.007; (ii) Coefficient significant at p<0.05 highlighted in bold. 
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Table 4. Further results of the ordered probit models (classical): determinants of public equity finance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    Robust     Robust     Robust     Robust   
Variables: Coef. Std.Err. P>z Coef. Std.Err. P>z Coef. Std.Err. P>z Coef. Std.Err. P>z 
assets_2000 0.00 0.00 0.607 0.00 0.00 0.740 0.00 0.00 0.972 0.00 0.00 0.925
av_ebt/sales (98-00) -1.72 1.31 0.191 -2.13 1.24 0.087 -2.36 1.22 0.053 -2.20 1.19 0.066
debt/assets_2000  -0.05 0.28 0.872 -0.02 0.29 0.955 0.08 0.30 0.789 0.20 0.30 0.514
divest  -0.10 0.59 0.865 -0.09 0.55 0.872 0.03 0.48 0.953 0.08 0.50 0.870
domest_inst_investor -0.04 0.36 0.901 0.02 0.37 0.957 0.05 0.37 0.886 -0.03 0.36 0.927
foreign_presence  -0.27 0.37 0.467 -0.14 0.41 0.728 0.03 0.36 0.939 0.03 0.36 0.941
leading_bank 0.58 0.34 0.090 0.55 0.35 0.116 0.40 0.36 0.269 0.30 0.35 0.396
largest shareholder's share (omitted category: 0-24%): 
25-49% 1.19 0.38 0.002 0.77 0.54 0.152             
50-100%       -0.55 0.47 0.244 -0.95 0.33 0.003       
linear                   -0.01 0.00 0.013
industrial sector (omitted category: heavy industry and mining): 
ind_labour_intensive -1.20 1.05 0.250 -1.26 1.07 0.241 -1.12 1.07 0.293 -0.82 1.06 0.436
ind_resource_intens -1.06 1.05 0.314 -1.02 1.08 0.346 -0.83 1.07 0.438 -0.64 1.07 0.548
ind_services -0.28 1.06 0.789 -0.38 1.08 0.727 -0.41 1.07 0.700 -0.25 1.06 0.810
ind_med&high_tech -9.67 1.11 0.000
-
10.05 1.14 0.000 -9.36 1.12 0.000 -9.68 1.08 0.000
poland  -0.13 0.43 0.760 -0.24 0.46 0.610 -0.18 0.46 0.696 -0.03 0.44 0.954
Number of observ 83     83     83     83     
Wald chi2 1945     2152     1978     3142     
Pseudo R2 0.102     0.111     0.098     0.08     
 
Notes: (i) For specification (2): two variables for largest shareholder’s shares are jointly significant at p=0.0027; (ii) Coefficient significant at p<0.05 highlighted in bold. 
 
